We use overdispersed Poisson regression models to study social networks in finance. We count an investor's social connections in different groups, such as cities or industries, as proportional to the number of stocks held by this investor that are headquartered in those cities or part of those industries. When connections are formed randomly, the count of such connections in any group follows a Poisson distribution. Using data from institutional and retail investors' holdings, we find instead overdispersion for some groups. It implies that investors have distinct propensities to form ties because they are part of networks. We relate these propensities to investor demographics, gauge the prevalence of city versus industry networks, and measure their value for investor performance. These models can be utilized to study any financial network where investment data are available.
Crisis of 2007, many have turned to the modeling of networks among banks and other financial intermediaries to explain financial contagion in the hopes of discovering a more stable financial architecture (see, e,g., Allen and Gale (2007) , Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan (2006) , Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2010) ). Additionally, networks have also made their way to corporate finance as networks of CEOs, venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and banks are influential in allocating resources (see, e.g., Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012) , Lerner and Malmendier (2013) , Shue (2013) , Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2010) ).
A question fundamental and common to all these endeavors is how to measure the presence and value of social networks. Yet, no systematic approach has emerged. Instead, studies typically attack this challenge by being creative in utilizing special data and exploiting unique situations to identify network effects. This approach is largely necessitated by a lack of comprehensive information about social networks. While this approach has been highly effective in generating insights, the cost is that it is difficult to generalize results from one setting to another. And in many important settings, such detailed network data might simply not be available.
In this paper, we show that overdispersed Poisson regression models, relying mostly on holdings or trade data that are typically available in most finance settings, can be used to study social networks in finance. These models were originally developed by statisticians Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman (2006) to analyze answers to survey questions from sociology ; , McCarty, Killworth, Bernard, Johnsen, and Shelley (2001) ) about the count of friends a person has in different groups within the general population. Importantly, they distinguish between being gregarious and being part of a network. Gregariousness is defined as people who differ in the expected number of social connections. However, their connections are formed randomly or independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) as in the random networks model literature following Erdös and Rényi (1959) . In contrast, being part of a network means that people from certain groups have non-i.i.d. propensities to form ties with each other. These models make use of an important result from Erdös and Rényi (1959) -namely, if connections are formed randomly, then the count of the number of friends a person has in any group follows a Poisson distribution.
While the Poisson distribution fits well the count of friends in certain groups, like people named Nicole or postal workers, Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman (2006) find that it does not fit well the count of friends in other groups, like prisoners. For instance, the count of friends in the prison population is highly overdispersed, in that most people surveyed know zero but some know many prisoners. That is, the variance of this count distribution significantly exceeds the mean of the count distribution, in contrast to what one would find with a Poisson distribution in which the variance equals the mean. Overdispersion then captures social connections to the prison population that are formed in a non-i.i.d. manner as some people have a non-i.i.d. propensity to know prisoners. This is presumably because the prison population constitutes a network while people named Nicole do not.
Although such survey data are rare in financial markets, we show that these models can be extended to study social networks in finance by using plentiful data on the actions of agents in financial markets such as their investment holdings or trades. For concreteness, we study investors' social networks by modeling the count of acquaintances in different groups, such as cities or industries, as proportional to the number of stocks an investor holds that are headquartered in a given city or are from a given industry. The idea is that since the stocks an investor chooses is a function of his network, we can infer that an individual who owns a "disproportionate" (in a sense that we will make precise shortly) number of stocks that are located in a certain city or that are part of an industry is more likely to have contacts in these cities or industries.
Our extension of the network model in Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman (2006) can be easily applied to many other contexts in finance, such as banking networks where one can count trades between a bank with other banks in different countries, or lending volume between banks and companies in different industries. In other words, while we do not have answers to survey questions about how many people investors know in different groups, we can proxy for answers to these questions by counting their investments across different categories.
Using panel data on the holdings of institutional and retail investors in different cities and industry groups, our dependent variable of interest is a monotonic transformation of the count of the number of stocks in those groups that are held by an investor. We estimate this model while allowing for heterogeneity in a number of important dimensions. First, we allow for different gregariousness across managers-more gregarious managers have in expectation more stocks. We view this set of estimates as akin to investor fixed effects that allow some investors to hold more stocks than others. But it does not affect our inference of whether an investor belongs to a network. This inference is instead made controlling for this heterogeneity similar to the aforementioned statistics literature on social networks. Having a lot of friends is not the same as being part of a network. One could simply have equal numbers of friends and hold a lot of stocks in every group by chance. Second, we allow different cities or industries to have different numbers of potential connections based on how many stocks are headquartered in the city or are part of an industry group. A city like New York, which has many firms headquartered there, will have many connections attached to it. Again, this is a control or adjustment as we want to keep city or industry sizes roughly similar.
Controlling for these two factors, we can then use our model to estimate the degree of overdispersion of the cross-sectional distribution of the count of stocks in any given group held by investors. We allow the degree of overdispersion to vary across groups. That is, we can estimate a different overdispersion parameter for each city or industry. If we have N investors, K groups (either cities or industries), we end up estimating N + 2K + J parameters with N × K number of observations reflecting the number of stock holdings in different groups. In addition, J is the degree of freedom needed to estimate semi-parametrically the transformation of the number of stocks into the number of social connections.
In our empirical analysis of the mutual fund holdings data from 1993 until now, we are careful to drop index and sector funds. Using the top 20 biggest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in terms of where stocks are headquartered as groupings, we find some overdispersion in most cities. Nevertheless, there is only pronounced overdispersion in San Jose, Los Angeles, New York, and San Diego, where the overdispersion parameter is around 2. Under the null Poisson random social connections setting, the overdispersion parameter for any given city should be 1. When we use the top 20 industry groupings instead of MSA groupings, we find similar overdispersion results. There is more overdispersion along industry categories than city groupings, which suggests that networks are more prevalent along industry lines than city lines. These results are robust to excluding managers located in a given city (and hence our results are not simply a manifestation of local bias) or controlling for fund style of the managers.
To get an intuition for our set-up, we plot in Figure 1 a histogram of the count of stocks headquartered in San Diego (left-panel) and Phoenix (right-panel) using the holdings of 1315 mutual fund managers reported in the fourth quarter of 2005. The x-axis is the number of stocks held by a manager. The y-axis is the frequency of managers. The counts are residuals after controlling for manager fixed effects and city size as described above. For San Diego, the mean of the count of stocks held by the mutual fund manager population is 1.83 with a variance of 12.7. For Phoenix, the mean is 1.43 and the variance is 2.4. San Diego is highly overdispersed while Phoenix is near Poisson. This indicates that there are some managers who own many stocks in San Diego while most own few. We then make the inference that there is a San Diego network of investors while there is none or a small one for Phoenix. That is, managers who invest in San Diego are more likely to be part of a network that guides them toward San Diego stocks than Phoenix.
Our major concern is that overdispersion might simply capture data errors or some outliers but that are otherwise uninformative. Indeed, overdispersion is often treated as a nuisance rather than something fundamentally informative as pointed out by Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman (2006) . However, in the context of social networks, the Poisson null model has a very natural interpretation a la Erdös and Rényi (1959) , which is what makes this overdispersed Poisson regression model informative about networks.
To assure ourselves that this overdispersion is not due to uninformative outliers, we relate our model's outputs to demographic information about the investors as well as the performance of their investments. To do this, we first use our model to calculate for each investor his relative propensity to have contacts in a city or industry (RPC). Our model gives a prediction for the expected number of stocks any investor should hold in a given group. An investor who holds a higher number of stocks than predicted is more likely to be part of that group (i.e. be part of that network). We then sum up the investor's scores across all the groups.
We show that these scores are tied to investor demographics (women share similar networks, i.e. have similar scores, compared to men and similarly for Republicans compared to Democrats), consistent with a large literature in sociology that finds networks are tied to demographics. We also gauge the prevalence of city versus industry networks. Interestingly, a manager's score using city groups is not very correlated with a manager's score using industry groups, suggesting that city and industry networks are not one and the same.
Most importantly, we regress fund performance on these managerial RPC scores, while controlling for a host of the usual explanatory variables for fund performance. We find that managers with higher RPC city scores outperform those with lower RPC scores by around 2.5% a year. We obtain similar but weaker results using industry scores. Our findings here are reminiscent of the Industry Concentration Index of Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) .
They find that managers who hold concentrated positions out-perform those that do not. Their interpretation is one of closet indexing as those with concentrated positions are less likely to be closet indexers. However, our measures and ICI are not very correlated and including ICI in the performance regression does not change the coefficient in front of our RPC score. Our findings that social networks are valuable echoes prior studies, which document the value of investor and CEO networks such as Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) and Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012) using unique data on these networks.
In addition to using institutional investor holdings data, we also use the Barber and Odean (2001) brokerage house retail investor holdings data and perform the same set of analyses. We generally find weaker social network effects for retail investors, but all the results are qualitatively similar in that we detect overdispersion in certain cities and industries and also find outperformance using our RPC scores. It is interesting to contrast the institutional and retail results as a statement about the prevalence of investor social networks across these two types of investors. The retail investor results also reassure us that our institutional investor results are not driven by unique mutual fund industry considerations. They seem more universal to investor networks.
Our contributions are two-fold. First, we introduce a new approach to the modeling of investors' social networks by extending statistical models of surveys on acquaintances in groups. The existing approach in economics and finance in modeling social interactions focused on excessive correlation of investors' actions due to them being part of the same group and sharing information (Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002) , Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) ). In other words, the null is that under non-social interaction there is no reason for the actions to be correlated after controlling for public signals. The challenge with the excess correlation approach is controlling for a rich enough set of public signals. This new approach differs in counting stock picks across different groups and making inferences on which groups are networks. Our new approach has a different null hypothesis premised on random social connections leading to a Poisson distribution of the count of investors' holdings in any given group. The challenge here is to rule out that overdispersion is simply due to some outliers.
Second, and at the same time, our study contributes to the literature in statistics on the sociology of networks pioneered in Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman (2006) . These papers have developed rich statistical models to study answers to surveys of questions on acquaintanceship networks. However, these studies are limited in terms of demographic or other information about the respondents. In applying these models to investor networks, we tap into a vast and rich database of such information about investor respondents including their investment performance. As a result, we can ask and answer many more questions about the determinants of the structure of social networks and the value of such networks for those who have them.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in Section II and the data and estimation procedures in Section III. We collect the result for mutual fund investors in Section IV and V and those of retail investors in Section VI. We conclude in Section VII. In the Appendix, we consider some generalizations of our model.
II. The Model
Our model follows Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman (2006) 's analysis of social networks. The key difference is that we do not observe answers to connections in different groups. We will instead use the number of holdings an investors has across different groups to proxy for their social connections. We will allow for a general flexible monotonic transformation of the number of connections in different groups to the number of holdings. This flexible transformation will be estimated along with the parameters describing the social networks.
A. Notation
Following Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman (2006) , we use the following notation for the social networks between investors and their acquaintances in different groups (cities or industries). There is a total population of N investors, with friends residing in a total of K groups. p ij : probability that investor i knows person j , a i ≡ j, j =i p ij : gregariousness (the expected total number of connections) of investor i ,
: proportion of total social connections that involves group k, where S k stands for "group k" ,
: investor i's expected relative propensity to befriend with people in group k , y ik : number of friends from group k made by person i , z ik : number of stock picks that investor i has in group k .
The parameters {a i } may be viewed as controls for investor fixed effects, while the parameters {b k } can be thought of as controls for group sizes.
We also model the count of acquaintances y ik in different groups as an increasing transformation of the number of stocks z ik an investor holds that belong to a given group.
1 Therefore,
we have y ik = h(z ik ), where h is the increasing transformation. In our baseline setup, we assume y ik is proportional to z ik , thus y ik = z ik /c where c is the transformation parameter.
B. The Null Model
If investors' social connections are independently and identically formed as in the classical model of Erdös and Rényi (1959) , the probability p ij of a link between an investor i and a person j from any particular group is the same for all pairs (i, j). It then implies that y ik follows a Poisson distribution with its mean λ ik = ab k equal to its variance. Furthermore, this model results in equal expected gregariousness a i for all investors and relative propensities g ik all equal to one.
However, some investors may be more gregarious and have more social ties in expectation. To account for the variability in gregariousness, we let parameters {a i } vary across individual investors. Hence y ik follows a Poisson distribution with a mean λ ik = a i b k , but relative propensities g ik are still all equal to one. We call this our null model.
C. The Overdispersed Model
An important departure from the null model is likely to occur if there are structured social networks formed in a non-i.i.d. fashion. To be more precise, we distinguish being part of a network from being merely gregarious. Being part of a network would mean that some investors have a non-i.i.d. relative propensity {g ik } to make connections to certain groups since the people in those groups constitute a structured network. As a result, we allow investors to differ not only in their gregariousness {a i }, but also in their relative propensity {g ik } to accommodate for the effect of social influence. Consequently, g ik > 1 if investor i has a higher relative propensity to connect to people from group k than an average investor in the population.
In the most general form where {g ik } varies for each (i, k) pair, y ik is distributed as Poisson with a mean λ ik = a i b k g ik . Since it is not possible to identify each g ik later in the estimation if they are all different, for each group k, we let g ik follow a gamma distribution with a mean equal to 1 and a variance equal to (ω k − 1) where ω k > 1.
2 As a standard result, such a Poisson-gamma mixture leads to a (marginal) distribution/density for y ik that is negative binomial (after integrating out g ik and using an appropriate reparameterization)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function and ζ ik = a i b k /(ω k − 1). y ik then has a mean equal to a i b k and a variance ω k a i b k that is greater than its mean (ω > 1). Therefore, we call this our overdispersed model. This is because variations in the relative propensities {g ik } have resulted in overdispersions, i.e. y ik 's variance exceeds its mean, in contrast to our Poisson null model with equal mean and variance a i b k . Moreover, the ω k 's are called overdispersion parameters.
They measure investors' non-identicalness in forming ties to certain groups and being part of structured social networks. Our primary goal is to estimate the overdispersion parameters {ω k } from our overdispersed model and thus learn about diversities that exist in the formation of investors' social networks. As a byproduct, we also estimate the gregariousness parameters {a i }, representing the expected number of acquaintances know by investor i, and the group size parameters {b k } that gauge the proportion of social connections involving group k.
D. Likelihood Function
Following from the density expression in (1), the likelihood function of y = {y ik } in our overdispersed model is
and the log-likelihood
LG
where LG(·) here denotes the log-gamma function log(Γ(·)) and ζ ik = a i b k /(ω k − 1) as stated before. Since we observe the stock holdings {z ik } of investors in different groups and y ik = h(z ik )
N × K number of g ik 's with only N × K number of data points.
3 For a reference on this type of Poisson-gamma mixture, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) , Chapter 20.
under the transformation h, the (log-)likelihood function in terms of z = {z ik } can then be expressed as
The parameters of interest in our model are
We also have N ×K observations of z ik . In addition, in our baseline scenario, y ik = z ik /c, so that the transformation parameter c will be estimated jointly with θ.
We shall estimate our model parameters using the method of maximum likelihood (MLE) based on (2), and we normalize K k=1 b k to one to separately identify {a i } and {b k }. 4 The estimation procedure is further discussed in the next section. 5 In the appendix, we will discuss the estimation mechanism and the associated results for the case where h is a general increasing transform. Additionally, we will also consider the estimation for another interesting scenario where z is a censored version of y.
III. Data and Estimation

A. Data
Our data on stock holdings of mutual funds are obtained from the CDA/Spectrum Mutual fund Common Stock Holdings database provided by Thompson Reuters for the period 1990-2011. The database sources from semi-annually mandatory filings to the SEC and quarterly voluntary disclosure by mutual funds. We then merge the CDA/Spectrum database with survivorship-bias free CRSP mutual fund database. The CRSP mutual fund database provides information on a variety of mutual fund characteristics such as fund locations, investment objectives, monthly fund returns and assets under management. Additionally, we augment our mutual fund data with the database used in Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) , which contains managerial demographic information on age, gender and political affiliation.
In order to keep only actively managed, non-sector domestic equity funds in our sample, we apply the following screening procedures. Firstly, to exclude international, bond and index funds, we require (1) funds' investment objective code reported by CDA/Spectrum to be aggressive growth, growth or growth and income, (2) their investment objectives in CRSP to be equity (E) and domestic (D) at the first two levels, (3) their CRSP objectives not to be EDCL, which indicates S&P500 index fund, and (4) their names not to contain anything in the vicinity of the word "index". Secondly, to exclude sector funds, we require funds' CRSP investment objectives at the third level to be either (C) or (Y). Thirdly, to exclude the possible presence of hedge funds, we require funds' CRSP investment objectives not to be (H) or (S) at the last level. This screening leaves us with a sample of 1680 unique actively managed, non-sector domestic equity funds, or 111144 fund-quarter observations on stock holdings.
6
Besides the institutional investor holdings data, we will also employ the retail investor holdings data from Barber and Odean (2001) . Their dataset contains the monthly investments of 78,000 households between January 1991 and December 1996 from a large discount brokerage firm. It includes all investment accounts opened by each household at this discount brokerage firm, thus we aggregate the account information if a household had multiple accounts. Moreover, we focus on the the common stock investments of these households and exclude investments in mutual funds (both open-and closed-end), American depository receipts, warrants, and options. In addition, we only consider those households that had 10 or more stocks in their monthly portfolios on average. This is because the subsequent analyses performed on retail investors are only meaningful if their numbers of stock picks are not too small. Finally, we will use the demographic information contained in Barber and Odean (2001) 's dataset on age, gender and household income for these retail investors.
7 Overall, we have 1609 unique retail investors (households) with demographic information and monthly holdings of 10 or more stocks on average, or about 93600 household-month observations.
8
Next, we categorize the stocks held by mutual funds or retail investors into city and industry groups. We use the information on companies' headquartered cities and their SIC industry codes that is available from the CRSP stock database. To obtain city groups for stocks, we match the city information of companies with the location information from COMPUSTAT, which maps cities into metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).
9 On the other hand, to obtain industry groups, we utilize the industry definitions of Fama-French 30 industry portfolios and classify each stock into a particular industry.
10
We shall only consider the largest 20 cites (MSAs) or largest 20 industries in terms of the number of located companies. The reason is because the 20 largest groups, either cities or industries, already cover approximately 80% of all the stocks held by mutual funds or retail investors in our sample. There is no significant value added by allowing for more groups in our study. Hence in what follows, the number of groups K is fixed at 20.
B. Rolling Estimation
We shall conduct a rolling maximum likelihood estimation on the model's parameters θ = ({ω k }, {a i }, {b k }) and the transformation parameter c using both the mutual fund and the retail investor holdings data. To be more precise, at each point in time (quarter for mutual funds and month for retail investors), we will use the past 12 quarters or months of holdings data as a rolling subsample to estimate θ and c based on the log-likelihood (2). The observations z ik are then the number of unique stock picks from a group k made by an investor i during the past 12 quarters or months. Therefore, our rolling estimates start at 1993Q1 (resp. Jan 1992) and end at 2011Q4 (resp. Dec 1996) for mutual funds (resp. retail investors).
After obtaining the rolling estimates, we will follow Fama and MacBeth (1973) in taking the time series means of the rolling estimates to form our overall estimates of θ and c. We denote these Fama-MacBeth estimates as our estimated parameter values.
IV. Main Results
In this section, we report our main estimation results based on the mutual fund data. We also perform the same set of analyses on retail investor data and the associated results will be shown in Section VI. . Table 1 presents the estimates (Fama-MacBeth means of the quarterly rolling estimates) and related summary statistics of the transformation parameter for both city groups and industry groups. We can see that the transformation parameter is larger when industry groups are considered for stocks. However, the difference between the estimates in the two group classifications is not substantial. Using city groups, the mean of the transformation parameter c is 1.37 with a standard deviation of .1 over time. There is not much variation over time in this parameter. This parameter estimates suggest that the number of contacts in a group is the number of holdings in that group divided by 1.37. Using industry groups, the mean of the transformation parameter is 1.53 with a standard deviation of .16.
Transformation Parameters
Gregariousness Parameters
Next, Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the estimated values of the gregarious parameters a i and Figure 2 and 3 illustrate the histograms of their Fama-MacBeth averages. We observe that investors tend to be somewhat more gregarious when stocks are classified into industry categories. The mean a i is 105 using city groups and 124.7 using industry groups. These estimates can be interpreted literally as the typical manager has around 10 friends in the mutual fund industry overall and just in our sample. But there is a fairly sizeable standard deviation of around 120 or so friends using either of the groupings. These estimates do not seem out of bounds relative to results in the sociology literature on the number of friends people have more generally.
Nevertheless, we view the estimates of gregariousness parameters are viewed as more akin to investor fixed effects for some investors having more stocks than others. They are separate from and do not affect our inference on whether investors belong to a network. In other words, having a lot of friends is not the same as being part of a network since it could also be affected by other factors such as investment style. 
Group Size Parameters
We then report the parameter estimates for b k that gauge the relative sizes of cities or industries. Table 3 and Figure 4 demonstrate the values of b k for the 20 cities, while Table 4 and Figure 5 show those for the 20 industries. Two aspects of the estimates are noticeable. First, there are a few groups that have a much larger number of potential social connections attached to them comparing to the rest, for example, New York in the city categories or Service in the industry categories. However, a group having a larger b k does not imply that the degree of overdispersion in the group would necessarily be higher. To put it another way, just because a city or a industry has a substantial (relative) size does not mean that investors are more likely to form structured social networks with individuals from that group. Second, most of the standard deviations of the Fama-MacBeth b k estimates are small, implying that the sizes of various groups are stable across time.
Figure 4: Boxplot of b k estimates, city groups, mutual funds Note: the green marker is the mean, the red line is the median, the box is the interquartile range, and the tails extend to the min and the max. For an explanation to the abbreviated city names, please refer to the note under Table 3 .
Overdispersion Parameters
Now we turn to the estimates of our main parameter of interest -the degree of overdispersion ω k among different groups. Recall that we introduced the overdispersions in our model in an attempt to estimate the variability in investors' relative propensities to form ties to members of different groups. For groups where ω k is closer to 1, it is quite possible that there is no much variation in these relative propensities. However, larger values of ω k would imply dissimilarities in individuals' relative propensities to make connections. Table 5 and Figure 6 display the estimated overdispersions ω k for city groups. There are three evident features. Firstly, New York, Los Angeles, San Jose and San Diego stand out as the most overdispersed cities compared to the rest. This suggests that investors are more likely to Note: the green marker is the mean, the red line is the median, the box is the interquartile range, and the tails extend to the min and the max. For an explanation to the abbreviated industry names, please refer to the note under Table 4 .
form and be part of structured networks with acquaintances from these cities. Secondly, cities being larger (in terms of b k ) does not necessarily imply cities being more overdispersed. The correlation between the Fama-MacBeth estimates of ω k and those of b k is about 0.37, and the rank correlation between them is merely about 0.23. Thirdly, although the majority of the cities do not exhibit a substantial degree of overdispersion, the t-statistics of testing the null Poisson distribution of ω = 1 are all significant at the 5% level. Hence it implies that some investors do belong to certain integrated social networks even in the smaller cities (in terms of b k ) such as Miami or Minnesota. Note: for an explanation to the abbreviated city names, please refer to the note under Table 3 . The t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey and West (1987) lags of order twelve since we use past twelve quarters as our rolling estimation window size. They test the null hypothesis of ω k = 1 (Poisson) against the alternative of ω k > 1 (overdispersion).
Next, Table 6 and Figure 7 present the estimated overdispersions ω k for industry groups. Compared to the previous set of ω k estimates from city groups, we notice a couple of key similarities. One is that there are some industries that show up as being much more overdispersed, such as Finance, Service and Utility. The other is that the t-statistics of testing the null Pois- Figure 6 : Boxplot of ω k estimates, city groups, mutual funds Note: the green marker is the mean, the red line is the median, the box is the interquartile range, and the tails extend to the min and the max. For an explanation to the abbreviated city names, please refer to the note under Table 3. son distribution of ω = 1 are also all significant at the 5% level, indicating the existence of delicate networks within each of the industry groups. On the other hand, it is observable that there is more overdispersion along industry classifications than city categories, which suggests that network connections are more prevalent along industry lines than city lines. Nonetheless, overdispersions are present independent of the type of group categorizations under consideration, which signifies that a number of investors live among some intricate social networks. They do not have to be the most gregarious investors, nor are they necessarily tied to the largest cities or industries. Note: for an explanation to the abbreviated industry names, please refer to the note under Table 4 . The tstatistics are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey and West (1987) lags of order twelve since we use past twelve quarters as our rolling estimation window size. They test the null hypothesis of ω k = 1 (Poisson) against the alternative of ω k > 1 (overdispersion).
Lastly, we report the results of two robustness checks on the overdispersion estimates using mutual fund data with city groups. The first check is a local-bias check, where we exclude managers' local stock holdings from the estimation to ensure that our overdispersion results are not due to local biases. The other one is a verification where we dropped all growth funds from Figure 7 : Boxplot of ω k estimates, industry groups, mutual funds Note: the green marker is the mean, the red line is the median, the box is the interquartile range, and the tails extend to the min and the max. For an explanation to the abbreviated industry names, please refer to the note under Table 4 . the estimation to ensure our results are not driven by fund styles.
As can be seen clearly from Table 7 , the results from the two robustness checks echo our earlier findings in Table 5 . We also did the no-growth-fund robustness check on industry groups too, and a similar result shows up. Thus it implies that the overdispersions we find are not subject to the influence of either local biases or fund styles. 
V. Networks, Demographics and Performances
Overdispersion is often treated as a nuisance rather than something fundamentally informative. But in the context of social networks, the Poisson null model has a very natural interpretation a la Erdös and Rényi (1959) 
of random social connections, which is what makes this overdispersed Poisson regression model informative about networks.
Our major concern is that overdispersion might simply capture data error or some outliers but that are otherwise uninformative. To show that this is not the case, we relate our model's output to demographic information about the investors as well as the performance of their investments.
This section reports the corresponding findings on the estimates from mutual fund data. The findings from retail investor data will be depicted in the next section.
A. RPC Measure and RPC Score
To examine such links between the estimation results and investor demographics or investment returns, we first use our model to calculate for each investor his relative propensity to have contacts (RPC) in a city or industry.
11 The RPC measure for any investor in a particular group k is computed as g ik = y ik /(a i b k ). 12 Our model predicts that an investor should have an expected number of a i b k connections in a given group, and that y ik should be very close to a i b k if connections are formed in an Erdös and Rényi (1959) i.i.d. manner. On the other hand, an investor who holds a (much) higher number of stocks and hence knows a (much) larger number of acquaintances than expected in a group is more likely to be part of and has g ik > 1 in that group, i.e. being part of that network.
Then we sum up investors' RPC measures across all the groups, i.e.
. We shall label this the RPC score for each investor and will use gsum i interchangeably with RPC score. Furthermore, if social connections are formed in an i.i.d. fashion so that y ik /(a i b k ) are around 1 for each (i, k) pair, we would expect all the RPC scores {gsum i } to be close to 20 as we have K = 20 groups. However, if there are structured social networks among various groups, we would anticipate gsum i > 20 for an investor i who is part of networks. This is because his underlying true k g ik = λ ik /(a i b k ) is likely to be greater than 20 as a result of social influences. Table 8 illustrates the correlations between our RPC measures g ik and our gregariousness parameter estimates a i , using their respective Fama-MacBeth averages. It is clear from the Table that the correlations between g ik and a i are rather mild for both city groups and industry 11 Recall that in our model, investors' expected relative propensities to know a member in group k, g ik = λ ik /(a i b k ), cannot be identified or estimated individually. The RPC measures that we construct, RP C ik = y ik /(a i b k ), can then be considered as a proxy for g ik . In other words, the RPC measures can be thought of as investors' realized relative propensities to know a member from a specific group.
12 Strictly speaking, this should be denoted asĝ ik = y ik /(â ibk ) (whereâ i andb k are our estimates) since it is not the real g ik that equals λ ik /(a i b k ). However, as stated before, we do not estimate individual g ik value in our model. Hence this notation is unlikely to cause any major confusion in what follows and we will denote g ik to mean y ik /(â ibk ). In addition, we will use g ik and RPC measure interchangeably.
groups. Such weak correlations further confirm that being gregarious and being part of a network are not one and the same, regardless of the group classification. Note: correlations are based on the Fama-MacBeth time-series means of g ik (for each k) and a i . For explanations on abbreviated city and industry group names, please refer to the notes under Table 3 and Table 4 respectively.
The summary statistics for our RPC scores gsum i are demonstrated in Table 9 as well as in Figure 8 and 9. We notice that the mean of RPC scores are close to 20, yet the standard deviation (around 5) is sizeable, with either city or industry groupings. Once more, this is another piece of evidence showing that certain investors have non-i.i.d. propensities to form ties with members from different groups. Furthermore, we find in Table 10 that for investors who have RPC scores greater than 20 (i.e. they are part of certain networks), the number of groups in which they have RPC measures larger than 1 is approximately nine. It indicates that for investors who are part of networks, they have higher propensities of making connections to certain groups only but not to all of the groups.
In addition, we compute the correlation between fund managers' RPC scores using city groups and those using industry groups. Interestingly, managers' scores from city groups are not very correlated with their scores from industry groups and the correlation coefficient is approximately 0.2. Thus it suggests that city and industry networks can be dissimilar for investors. 
B. Social Networks and Investor Demographics
Having calculated our RPC score for each manager, we are now in a position to examine how our social-network estimates are related to demographic information about the mutual fund managers. To entertain such relationships, we employ the following regression specification that is similar to the framework used in Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) :
where log(gsum −j ) SG denotes the excluding-j average of log(gsum) (i.e. RPC scores) for managers that are in the same demographic characteristic category as manager j, and log(gsum) AG denotes the average of log(gsum) for managers that are from the alternative category. α is a constant and is the error term. We consider three types of demographic characterization for mutual fund managers: gender (male/female), age (above/below 45 years old), and political affiliation (Democrat/Republican). The observations are pooled together across time first and the regressions are then performed over both the city group and the industry group results. Table 11 summarizes the regression results from regression specification (3). As can be seen, the coefficient β is always significant at the 5 % significance level except for the case of political affiliation. More importantly, the magnitude of β is larger than that of γ across all three demographic categories, and a simple F -test on β = γ in each of the categories rejects at the standard significance level.
Therefore, the results tell us that a manager's RPC score loads more heavily on the average score of managers who share the same demographics as the manager himself. Hence it indicates that the RPC scores are tied to investor demographics, in the sense that women share similar networks compared to men and similarly for young versus old managers or Democrats versus Republicans. Such results are consistent with a large literature in sociology that finds people's social networks are tied to their demographics in general. Note: dependent variable is log(gsum i ). Gender: male and female. Age: old (above 45 yrs) and young (below 45 yrs). Politics (political affiliation): Democrat and Republican. ave(log(gsum)), same grp denotes the average (excluding i) of log(gsum)'s that are in the same characteristic group as i. ave(log(gsum)), alter grp denotes the average of log(gsum)'s that are from the alternative group. The regressions are performed by pooling together the observations across time. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses and they are computed based on the Newey-West heteroskedasticity (along the individual dimension) and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
C. Social Networks and Investor Performances
Now we turn our attention to a more important question, which is how social networks, i.e. our RPC scores gsum, are related to mutual fund performances. There is a range of existing literature suggesting that social networks could exert positive values on investment performances, e.g. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) , Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) and Feng and Seasholes (2008) . Networks, such as knowing someone who is the CEO of a company, are not easy to obtain and may contain valuable investment information not accessible by the common public. Based on these ideas, the presence of structured networks in our model would imply that investors with RPC scores (much) larger than 20 should earn higher returns on their investment portfolios. Consequently, active equity funds with larger RPC scores should enjoy higher performances than their counterpart with smaller scores.
To test such implications, we utilize the following regression specification from Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) to examine the effect of social networks on mutual fund performance:
where the dependent variable pf m i,t is fund i's net return in quarter t. RP Cdummy i,t−1 is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i's RPC score gsum i is greater than 20 in quarter t.
Furthermore, x i,t−1 is a vector of standard fund characteristic controls at t − 1. They include: (1) fund i's lagged pf m at t − 1, (2) log of total net asset of fund i, (3) log of one plus the total net asset of other funds in fund i's family, (4) expense ratio of fund i, (5) turnover ratio of fund i, and (6) fund i's age. Additionally, we also control for the gregariousness of a manager via his log(a i ) and for whether a fund is located in a financial center (which is found by Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) to be associated with superior performance). They are contained in the regressor x as well. Finally, α is a constant term and ε i,t is a generic error term uncorrelated with all other explanatory variables in 4. We will carry out the regression 4 quarter by quarter and then take the Fama-MacBeth time-series means and Newey-West standard errors of the quarterly estimates. Table 12 depicts our fund performance regression results. Most of the coefficients come in with the expected signs given the results in Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) . For instance, fund size (log TNA) is associated with poor returns. There is persistence in performance and expense ratio is associated with poor returns. Moreover, we find consistent with Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) that a fund located in the financial center has superior performance.
Most relevant for us, it is evident that fund managers with higher RPC scores (i.e. with gsum > 20) outperform substantially, by about 2.5% a year using city groups and about 2% per annum using industry groups. Moreover, when we include both city RPC scores and industry RPC scores in the regression, both scores entail significant outperformance numbers. Nevertheless, the effect from city RPC scores is somewhat larger and more significant than the effect from industry RPC scores. Finally, we notice that being gregariousness does not necessar-ily lead to outperformance, as the coefficient on log(a i ) is close to zero and is insignificant. Thus this supports our prediction that being gregarious is not the same as being part of networks. Note: this table reports the Fama-MacBeth estimates of the regression coefficients in specification 4, with tstatistics based on Newey-West HAC standard errors (of lag order 12) shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable is fund's net return at quarter t. gsum > 20 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a fund's RPC score gsum is larger than 20. FinCenter is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a fund is located in a financial center. The following six cities are defined to be financial centers: Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, in the spirit of Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) .
The findings on the influence of RPC scores on mutual fund performances here are reminiscent of the Industry Concentration Index (ICI) of Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) . They find that managers who hold concentrated positions outperform those that do not. Their interpretation on ICI is along the lines of closet indexing as those with concentrated portfolio holdings are less likely to be index-fund mimickers. However, our RPC scores and ICI are not very correlated and including ICI in the performance regression does not change the coefficient in front of our RPC scores. This is shown in the robustness-check Table 13 where ICI is included as an extra explanatory variable in the regression specification of (4). In addition, our result that social networks are valuable to the tune of 2.5% a year for mutual fund returns is evocative of earlier studies documenting the value of investor and CEO networks such as Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) and Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012) . Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) is added as an explanatory variable. The ICI is constructed in a similar manner as Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) , but for simplicity, we use an equally weighted index instead. Fama-MacBeth estimates of the regression coefficients are reported, with t-statistics based on Newey-West HAC standard errors (of lag order 12) shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
VI. Retail Investors
To ensure that our results on institutional investor networks are not driven by unique mutual fund industry considerations, we perform the same set of analyses on Barber and Odean (2001) 's retail investor stock holdings data. The relevant results are reported in this section. Because all the results on retail investor data are qualitatively similar to those on mutual fund data, we shall keep our discussions brief.
Transformation and Gregariousness Parameters
To start with, Table 14 and 15 illustrate the transformation and gregariousness parameter estimates respectively for retail investors. In general, both of the two sets of estimates are smaller compared to those from mutual fund data. This is because retail investors hold a much smaller number of stocks in contrast to mutual fund managers. On the other hand, the estimates are larger when industry groups are used. This is very similar to our earlier findings on mutual fund managers.
Again, we are interpreting these coefficients as investor fixed effects. Though one could also reasonably conclude that retail investors are likely to have much smaller investor networks than mutual fund managers. 
Group Sizes and Overdispersion Parameters
Next, Table 16 and 17 show the estimated values of b k for city and industry groups respectively. They are very close to the estimates from using mutual fund data. In particular, the correlation between the "mutual-fund" city group sizes and the "retail-investor" city group sizes is 0.96, while the corresponding correlation between the two sets of industry group sizes is 0.87. Table 18 and 19 then document the overdispersion estimates with city and industry group classifications. In general, we find that the overdispersion parameters become smaller when retail investor data are used, suggesting that social networks effects are weaker for retail investors. However, qualitatively, the estimates are still similar to the ones from mutual fund data in that every group is overdispersed to some extent and that there are major overdispersions in certain cities or industries (e.g. San Jose or Utility). 
RPC scores, Demographics and Portfolio Returns
Lastly, we depict for retail investors their RPC scores and how these RPC scores are tied to their demographic information and investment portfolio returns. Similar to our institutional investor results, we notice that for retail investors, their RPC scores are also connected to their demographics as shown in Table 21 . More importantly, as Table 22 suggests, the RPC scores also lead to outperformance in retail investors' common-stock portfolios. The outperformance is about 1.33% using city groups and about 1.45% using industry groups.
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Through comparing the institutional and retail investor results, we can see that social networks are more prevalent among mutual fund managers than among ordinary households. However, the qualitative resemblance between the two sets of results implies that the impact of social networks seems to be universal and is not confined to the particular system of the mutual fund industry. Note: dependent variable is log(gsum i ). Gender: male and female. Age: old (above 45) and young (below 45). Affluence: households with total equity above $100000 is considered affluent. ave(log(sum)), same grp denotes the average (excluding i) of log(gsum i )'s that are in the same characteristic group as i. ave(log(sum)), alter grp denotes the average of log(gsum i )'s from the alternative group. Due to the small numbers of stock picks, gsum is over the largest 5 groups where retail investors have a meaningful number of holdings.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the overdispersed Poisson regression models used in statistics and sociology to study social networks in finance. Even though detailed network data is not typically available in finance settings, we show that we can model the count of an investor's social connections in different groups, such as cities or industries, as proportional to the number of stocks an investor holds that are headquartered in these cities or part of these industries. When connections are formed randomly, the count of these connections in any group follows a Poisson distribution. When connections are formed in a non-i.i.d. manner, the count of these connections in any group follows an overdispersed Poisson. Using data from institutional and retail investors' holdings, we estimate the degree of overdispersion for different groups. We find substantial overdispersion for some city groups such as San Diego, Los Angeles and San Jose, and Note: dependent variable is return t , the monthly gross return on a investor's common-stock portfolio. T otalStockV alue is the market value of an investor's stock portfolio measured in logs, CommissionRatio is the monthly commissions paid (from trades) as a percentage of the T otalStockV alue, and HHequityvalue is the total household equity value of an investor measured in logs. For retail investors, the RPC score dummy, gsum > 5, is over the largest 5 groups only where investors actually have a meaningful number of stock picks.
for some industry groups such as Finance and Utilities. Our model also allows us to predict the relative propensity of any investor to be connected to a group. We show that these propensities are tied to investor demographics and are highly correlated with superior investor performance, suggesting that such networks are valuable. These models can be used to study any financial network where investment data are available. Our set-up can be easily applied to many other contexts in finance such as banking networks where one can count trades between a bank with other banks in different countries or lending volume between banks and companies in different industries. In other words, while we do not have answers to survey questions about how many people investors know in different groups, we can proxy for answers to these questions by counting their investments across different categories. In short, the value of our set-up is that it connects the study of social networks in finance, which is hampered by limited data on social connections, to the study of social networks in statistics and sociology, which is hampered by data on performance. We hope this application of count models of social networks in financial markets might be useful for many different endeavors. . Thus we could use the matching function to map each z ik back to its corresponding value of y ik . In other words, if we know all the {∆ s }, then we know the increasing transform h (hence y ik ) for each unique z ik that we observe. Therefore, the step sizes {∆ s } are the additional parameters that we would like to estimate.
In this situation, let us denote the dimensionality of ∆ = {∆ s } by J, where J equals the number of unique realizations of z ik minus one. Our main parameters of interest are θ = ({ω k }, {a i }, {b k }) , an N + 2K vector. Hence we will use an N × 2K number of observations {z ik } to estimate a N + 2K + J number of parameters θ and ∆. The log-likelihood function in terms of z = {z ik } then becomes
LG H(z ik , ∆) + ζ ik − LG(ζ ik ) − LG H(z ik , ∆) + 1 − ζ ik log(ω k ) + H(z ik , ∆) log(ω k − 1) − log(ω k ) , where H(z ik , ∆) is defined as above. To estimate the parameters under a general transform h, we will adopt a technique similar to the profile maximum likelihood (see, e.g. Murphy, Rossini, and van der Vaart (1997) , Murphy and van der Vaart (2000) ). This method has been used in transformation models where the underlying interest y is a increasing transform of the observable variable z. The intuition has been discussed in the main body of this article and can be understood as follows. For each possible values of {∆ s }, we first compute the maximum likelihood estimate of θ and the corresponding maximal value of the log-likelihood, then we find the values of {∆ s } such that the log-likelihood attains the maximum with the associated θ estimate. We estimated our model under a general transform h using the mutual fund data with city groups, and we illustrate the results here. Since most of the results are similar to the ones from our baseline case, we will keep the illustration parsimonious and concise.
To start with, Table 23 show the estimates for the gregariousness parameters. We can notice that compared to the baseline result in Table 2 , the estimates are somewhat larger, but the differences are quite small. Next, the overdispersion parameter estimates are reported in Table 24 . We observe that the overdispersions have increased in magnitude. However, New York, Los Angeles, San Jose and San Diego remain as the cities that appear to have substantial overdispersions, which is in line with our baseline results.
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Lastly, we can see from Table 25 and Table 26 that the RPC scores based on the current estimates under a general transform h are also tied to managers' demographic information and have a positive impact on mutual fund returns. In particular, the outperformance number from the RPC score is 2.54% a year, consistent with what we found earlier in our baseline model.
A Censored Model
In the second part of the appendix, we discuss the scenario where our observable {z ik } is a censored version of the underlying {y ik }. To be more specific, we consider a censoring threshold U , such that    y ik = z ik if we observe z ik is strictly less that U y ik ≥ U if we observe z ik is greater than or equal to U . Therefore, with such a censoring, the log-likelihood becomes
LG(z ik + ζ ik ) − LG(ζ ik ) − LG(z ik + 1) − ζ ik log(ω k ) + z ik log(ω k − 1) − log(ω k ) + (1 − d ik ) log 1 − P (U |ζ ik , ω k )
where d ik is an indicator variable such that d ik = 1 if z ik < U , and P (U |ζ ik , ω k ) is the negative binomial cumulative distribution function
This model can then be estimated using the usual maximum likelihood method. Additionally, one could also adapt it to the more complex case where y is an increasing transform of z if z < U .
We estimated the censored version of our model as illustrated above, with a range of censoring levels U = 50, 75, 100, 125. In general, we find that the estimation results under censoring are all qualitatively similar to the results from our baseline model. The main noticeable difference is that the estimates for the overdispersion parameters {ω k } become larger due to the effect of censoring.
